F ew things seem to spark debate about the meaning of conservatism more than election results. When Republicans do poorly in elections, the various factions within the conservative movement attempt to explain why their political ideology has fallen out of favor with voters and what can be done to put Republicans back in power. When Republicans do well in elections, expectations are raised that the nation will move away from liberal policies because conservatives are at the helm. The presumption is that election results and public policy accomplishments are the standard for measuring the success and health of the conservative movement. This assumption is misleading.
As should be evident to anyone who witnessed the past 30 years of American politics, the Republican Party is not a conservative political party. Conservative ideas and individuals find their way into the Republican Party but they do not constitute a critical mass that can use the party as an instrument for conservative reform. There is nothing akin to a Burkean wing of the Republican Party. Conservatives are a small minority in a party that is dominated by liberals of either the classical variety or its neoconservative strain. It should come as no surprise, then, that unlike the Democratic Party that consistently produces liberal programs and policies, Republican-controlled Congresses and Republican Presidents rarely produce what can be considered conservative outcomes. They tend to spend taxpayer money recklessly, create new federal programs and expand existing ones, and in some cases appoint and confirm federal judges like David Souter, Harry Blackmun, Sandra Day O'Connor, John Paul Stevens, William Brennan, and Earl Warren. By contrast, what does a list of conservative Supreme Court Justices appointed by Democratic Presidents over the past 100 years look like? About the only candidate, and not an obvious one, on such a list would be Byron White who was appointed by JFK. Prior to the Obama appointments, Republican presidents put 11 of the last 13 justices on the Supreme Court. These appointments occurred over a span of almost 40 years. While there have been some conservative victories on the Court in this period, the overall trend has continued its trajectory from the New Deal as the Court has continued to engage in a brand of activism that renders the Constitution a virtual dead letter. The pernicious and deceptive notion of a living constitution has only gained support since the ascendency of the Republican Party.
In some cases when Republicans capitulate to the Democrats, the argument is made that they did what was possible under the circumstances or that ground had to be given in one place to gain it in another. Assuming such tactics are necessary, what does it say about the political culture that in order to promote their agenda, conservatives must give significant ground but liberals very little? If the culture is what animates politics, then why do conservatives tend to ignore it and focus their attention on elections and public policies? Why are so many conservatives seemingly obsessed with Washington politics when it has repeatedly disappointed them? The drift of National Review is an example of this very problem. It has become fixated on public policy debates while devoting less and less attention to the cultural capital that shapes public policy and animates political conduct. One of the primary characteristics of the conservative movement is an impatient desire to transform American politics that is understandable among Young Republicans and political activists. Yet, the conservative movement appears at times to be led by adolescents who have yet to learn that meaningful and lasting political change is the derivative of decades, if not centuries, of intellectual and ethical work that shapes the imagination and character of those who assume the responsibility of political leadership. Conservatives would benefit from a more contemplative and deliberative approach to politics that was realistic about the prospects for restoring the constitutional order.
Cicero's On Duties is an example of a philosophical work that understands the ethical and cultural prerequisites that make the kind of political life the American Framers envisioned possible. Maintaining a republic requires attunement of character to moral duty. Sound constitutional politics is not produced from nothing or from the talking points of television and radio talk show hosts who exhibit the very adolescent impatience and unreflective demeanor that plague the conservative movement. The work of building a culture that can support constitutional government, at its best, is never-ending. It requires constant attention to the philosophical, aesthetical, religious, and literary insights of thinkers, artists, clergy, and poets that attune individuals to the summum bonum. As Aristotle knew, cultivating civilization is the work of magnanimous individuals who possess the requisite virtue and taste to inspire others to live according to the highest standards of human life. Without the presence of the quality of imagination that such insights produce, using politics as the instrument to foster the ends of civilization is an act of futility.
That conservatives must swim against a nearly insurmountable cultural current should be evident from the fact that Republicans of genuine conservative sentiment find it difficult to promote their ideas to a hostile media and a skeptical electorate.
1 Facing such difficult odds, their tendency is to cater to these cultural forces rather than to lead them. Consequently, meaningful and effective political leadership requires that the cultural ground be prepared by intellectuals, poets, artists, composers and the like, who cultivate an affinity for what conservatives think is essential to civilization. Politics is part of this process but not its whole; it is closer to the end or culmination of the process, not its genesis. In short, the conservative rhetoric of Republicans on Capitol Hill rarely translates into conservative political action. The starting point for the reinvigoration of American conservatism, then, is the realization that it is possible for conservatism to play a vibrant role in shaping American attitudes and behavior without it being a success at the polls. American attitudes and culture will not become conservative because more Republicans get elected. A cultural shift is necessary in order to move American politics in a more conservative direction. The point should be clear: the measure of success, when considering the viability of conservatism, is not election results but the long-term health of American civilization. Conservative intellectuals in the mid-twentieth century were deliberately engaged in cultural restoration. Important lessons can be learned from their experience and the ensuing rise and fall of the political Right in American politics.
Assessing the political and cultural influence of conservative ideas in America is the topic of Paul Gottfried's Conservatism in America: Making Sense of the American Right. In his view, conservatives have failed to inspire either political or cultural change of any significance. In fact, what has passed for conservatism at least since the 1980s, and perhaps since the 1950s, is not authentic conservatism but a reconstituted version of New Deal liberalism or a bourgeois liberalism. Gottfried does not limit his criticisms of conservatism to neoconservatives but includes the intellectual founders of the conservative movement. He argues that America does not provide a home for conservatives so much as an orphanage. This conclusion is, by Gottfried's own admission, similar to Louis Hartz's 2 thesis that liberalism is the exclusive American tradition. In some sense, Gottfried argues that conservatism was doomed from the start because it lacked the historical, intellectual, and cultural roots necessary for it to flourish in America. For this reason, he finds much to disagree with in Russell Kirk's conception of conservatism, including his use of Edmund Burke as the central figure in an American brand of conservatism. Burke's defense of the rights of Englishmen, for example, does not resonate in America, according to Gottfried. Kirk helped create a conservatism that was in some sense stillborn because it was out of touch with the culture it aimed to influence. The success of neoconservatism, by contrast, is due to the fact that it is more attuned to American culture because it accepts and is part of the liberal tradition (e.g., social contract theory).
Gottfried's criticism of Kirk's conservatism goes beyond its compatibility with American history and culture. Gottfried calls Kirk a "movement player" who "tried to adjust to the political situation." 3 He implies that Kirk changed his ideas in order to make a living, which is an interesting change given that Kirk gave up the life of a university professor in order to escape the ideological influences of the academy and become an independent scholar and man of letters. It is possible that Kirk's alleged catering to the prejudices of foundations and his non-insulting demeanor had more to do with his magnanimous disposition than pretense.
Gottfried is also critical of what he calls "values conservatism"-the use of universal values, like natural law, to define what conservatism means and give it a sense of permanence. The consequence of emphasizing permanent values is that the conservative movement has protected itself "from having to look more deeply at its own problems, most particularly its lack of connection to an older and more genuine conservatism and its general tendency to move leftward to accommodate those with whom it shares the public spotlight." 4 In other words, emphasis on permanent values disguises the fact that the movement continues to be pulled toward the very cultural and political forces it aims to oppose. It is precisely this drift that caused Gottfried to break with the conservative movement. He justifies his decision to divorce himself from the conservative movement by drawing a distinction between Kirk on the one hand and T. S. Eliot and Robert Nisbet on the other. Kirk tried to be part of the conservative movement and maintain his intellectual independence, an effort that Gottfried claims failed because of the near hegemonic control of the movement by neoconservatives. As Gottfried explains, Kirk's attempt "to create for himself a niche as a 'cultural conservative' within the movement" was a "futile gesture given the particularities of his institutional associations. Kirk was dependent on neoconservative benefactors who effectively required him to spend his declining years manufacturing traditionalist-sounding phrases for their use." 5 Gottfried suggests that Eliot and Nisbet successfully remained aloof from the conservative movement and were consequently able to maintain their intellectual integrity. It is worth noting that to this day Kirk's ideas are treated with disdain by most neoconservatives.
Whatever may have been the case with Kirk's relationship to neoconservative foundations and organizations, his scholarship remains a thorn in their side. Gottfried, no doubt, exaggerates the influence of neoconservatism on the substance of Kirk's work. He provides no examples from Kirk's writings to support his claim. One is hard-pressed to find in Kirk's many books and essays the slightest nod to neoconservative ideas, but those that run contrary to neoconservatism are abundant. 6 A significant part of Gottfried's book explains and illustrates the neoconservative takeover of the conservative movement. This topic is not new to Gottfried's writings 7 and less interesting than his criticism of traditional conservatives like Kirk as well as his assertion that America is unfertile ground for conservative ideas. That liberalism has been a greater influence in twentieth-century American politics and culture than conservatism is less a commentary on the viability of conservatism in America and more a commentary on the nature of modernity. Because conservatism is a reaction to modernity, especially to mass culture and revolutionary movements, it should not be surprising that either American politics or American culture generally are unwelcoming to conservative ideas.
To a certain extent, if American history and culture provided compatibility with conservatism, it would not be needed as a political force. For example, a conservative movement was unnecessary in eighteenth-century America to produce the Constitution. At the time of the Constitutional Convention, "conservatives" would have had little reason to think of themselves as conservatives or to organize into a political party. The Articles of Confederation that the convention delegates decided to replace were not opposed because, like the French Revolution, they were imbued with gnostic pathos that aimed to destroy the traditional order. The Articles of Confederation, like the Constitution, were the product of a conservative culture. Replacing the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution was not a matter of deep ideological shift but practical statesmanship. It is difficult to imagine a twenty-first century constitutional convention producing such a sober and practical document. The current romantic affinity for centralized power, democratism (which includes global democracy), and human goodness make the creation of a constitutional system of the same pedigree as the eighteenth-century American Framers' constitution highly unlikely, if not impossible.
Gottfried raises a few important points that get to the heart of figuring out both the meaning of American conservatism and whether or not it fits the cultural and historical contours of America's past. It may well be that American conservatism is and always has been a countercultural movement that asks of a people to live up to standards that are difficult to attune one's life and society. If this is the case, conservatism is not a lost cause but something more akin to the conscience of the society pulling it closer to the permanent things even though social and political order always fall short of the standard. Gottfried raises an important question about the compatibility of conservatism and American culture that is worth examining in more detail.
Is Conservatism at Home in America?
Gottfried's relationship to conservatism is a bit like Dorothy's relationship to OZ. There is something unsettling about OZ that makes Dorothy feel out of place and that sends her on a quest to return home to Kansas. She senses something familiar and even endearing in OZ, but believes that the only place for her is home. Likewise, Gottfried is not sure that as a man of the Right he has a place in the conservative movement. He concludes that the conservative movement is foreign to his political and philosophical disposition because conservatism can only succeed in American politics when it masquerades as liberalism. Better to go home to Kansas, the authentic political Right, than to live in the pretentious land of OZ where conservatives are little more than the liberals they oppose.
Gottfried, like many conservatives, feels out of place in America because it is in a state of cultural decline that is marked by the ascendency of liberalism. Yet in what appears to be a land foreign to conservative sentiments, the elements necessary for a flourishing civilization are present. The restoration of American culture will require a persistent and courageous effort to oppose the forces of modernity/postmodernity. The near future promises to be especially difficult for conservatives who have been reduced to a rather small number of men and women willing to continue the fight against difficult odds. Like Gottfried, some have decided to cede conservatism to the enemy. Others have decided to stay and fight the good fight.
The current circumstances as described by Donald Atwell Zoll illustrate the point. "We have thus come full circle: contemporary conservatism in America began as a small platoon of intellectuals out of step with the cultural mainstream; it grew, flourished, metamorphosed and was betrayed, and is now again what it was in the beginning, for good or ill, the philosophical profession of a small phalanx of domestic exiles." 8 This characterization of conservatism, combined with Gottfried's postmortem, is likely to leave many conservatives in a pessimistic frame of mind. Like Dorothy, however, we may not be as far from home as we think. While Gottfried may not agree, the American and Western past provide a wealth of cultural and intellectual capital from which to draw the substance of cultural renewal. The onus, however, is on conservative intellectuals not only to make use of that capital but to be the creators of new or reconstituted conceptions of the good life that are tailored to the circumstances and challenges of twenty-first century America. It may be, for example, that a more cosmopolitan reach is necessary to attract the attention of generations raised on multiculturalism. Irving Babbitt's work incorporated Eastern ideas, especially from Buddhism and Confucianism, that were not intended to replace Western conceptions of the true, good, and beautiful but to bring clarity to them and enrich them by raising the prospect of synthesis. Eric Voegelin did something similar in his study of order and history, going where the evidence of experiences of order led him as a way of understanding the Western crisis and nature of political, social, and existential order. For the American Framers' tradition to be a living force in contemporary life, it must be more than a stale and stagnant set of abstract ideas. It must not become the end of the search for American order and identity but a central part of the ongoing struggle to achieve the ends of civilized life. There is a tendency in some variants of conservatism to end the search for order by claiming that the ultimate trans-historical principles with which justice and the good can be discerned have been identified. According to this view, efforts to synthesize old insights and historical experiences with new ones smacks of moral relativism, the plague of the modern world.
Gottfried is correct to criticize values conservatism if he means that it claims to have captured the true, good, and beautiful for all time and that it has reified the living experiences of civilization into political dogmas. At the heart of the debate over the meaning of conservatism is the meaning of universality. Conservatism came into being, in part, as an intellectual counterweight to the moral relativism of modernity. In some cases, conservatism overreacted to moral relativism by providing a conception of universality or transcendence that was ahistorical and abstract.
Gottfried uses Harry Jaffa as an example of a values conservative who has dogmatized conservatism. Jaffa's affinity for Lincoln's vision of America as a nation based on the proposition of equality, is a case in point. For Jaffa, Lincoln completed the American search for the good society by correcting the Framers' failure to found the nation adequately on the principle of equality. Consequently, the suggestion that either Lincoln might not have had it right or that a variation of Lincoln's understanding of the good is necessary tends to be met with the charge of relativism. It is unthinkable to Jaffa that an American can reject the particular conception of universality present in the Declaration of Independence or Lincoln's political theory and be adequately attached to universal values.
More appalling to Jaffa is a conception of universality that conceives of it as both changing and permanent. In his view, universal values must be trans-historical, and thus, unchanging to be authentic. The mere suggestion that universality and change can be reconciled meets with the charge of relativism. Because Edmund Burke's political theory poses this very synthesis of permanence and change, Jaffa's mentor Leo Strauss lumps Burke in with modern relativists. 9 It is interesting to note that Jaffa's criticism includes Burke's "denunciation of an allegedly theoretical politics, which embraced the principles of the American Revolution no less than the French." Jaffa sides with the Jacobins rather than Burke because the former espoused a universal principle that, he believes, is present in the Declaration of Independence and Lincoln's political theory, the principle of equality. 10 These competing conceptions of universality mark one of the central fault lines in the conservative intellectual movement. Which conception of universality prevails in the imaginations of conservative intellectuals and activists has much to do with the kind of politics the conservative movement produces. Claes G. Ryn's America the Virtuous and The New Jacobinism illustrate the political consequences of following trans-historical conceptions of universality. Neoconservative support for Wilsonian foreign policy in the Bush administration is an example of the political fruit that such theories bear. A more Burkean conception of universality is likely to lead to a more modest foreign policy that avoids meddling in the affairs of other nations in order to convert them to democratic capitalism. Walter A. McDougall differentiates between these competing types of foreign policy in his Promised Land, Crusader State. He makes it clear that American foreign policy was not always dominated by the crusader state mentality that was evident in Woodrow Wilson's conception of foreign policy. A modest and sober view of America's role in the world was present in the foreign policy of George Washington and Alexander Hamilton.
Another important dividing line between traditional conservatives and neoconservatives is the historical and theoretical ground on which the nation developed. If Locke is the progenitor of American constitutionalism, then our constitutional politics takes a different shape than if its roots are traced to Cicero, the Christian tradition, and Hume. Locke's political theory is attractive to those who conceive of universality in terms of universal natural rights and who emphasize the role of private property and wealth accumulation as paramount to happiness. The ahistorical origins of society, as presented by Locke and other social contract theorists, are difficult to reconcile with the notion that political communities are historically constituted. The notion, for example, that America was "founded" or that it is an idea tends to ignore the cultural and historical antecedents that contributed to the formation of the American Constitution. If America is an idea or proposition, then constitutional politics becomes a matter of abiding by the original idea or proposition rather than being part of a historical community that must maintain continuity with its past while searching for new ways to meet the challenges of civilized life.
Neoconservatives tend to see progressivism as the central obstacle to maintaining fidelity to founding principles. Progressives, drawing on the zeitgeist that gave rise to Darwinism, undermine the American idea because they want America to evolve into something that moves it away from the universal values that gave it life in the eighteenth century. To follow this progressive thinking is to subject the development of the nation to the arbitrary forces of evolutionary change. The notion of the living constitution, for example, allows judges to subordinate founding principles to the forces of change in contemporary life. If the meaning of the Constitution is allowed to evolve with the ideological trends of the times, the universal principles that provide the foundation and anchor for American constitutionalism, and justice itself, will be lost.
Conservatives of all types are generally united in their opposition to the progressive notion of the living constitution. But not all conservatives would agree that the best way to oppose the doctrine of living constitutionalism is to argue that the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence embody unchanging universal principles. Charles R. Kesler sides with Jaffa and submits that "the real crisis of our time is the loss of confidence in what America's convictions or principles are." In responding to the crisis, conservatives should realize that "conservatism, rightly understood, is less a commitment to the past than a commitment to certain truths applicable to past, present, and future." Philosophy discovers these enduring truths because reason has a "trans-historical ability . . . to take its bearings from nature." If reason fails in this regard, it is "the slave of history." 11 Conservatives should engage in the recovery of trans-historical truths and principles, something distinct from Voegelin's efforts to recover the engendering experiences of order.
The works of Irving Babbitt, an early twentieth-century opponent of the progressives, provide an understanding of universality that avoids the amorphous conception of the good associated with progressivism and the legalistic and abstract conception of universality promoted by Jaffa. Babbitt, who drew on the works of Aristotle and Burke, was insightful in his description of universality as a oneness that is always changing. In other words, universality is only experienced through the particularities of historical life. Human beings cannot escape from the contingencies of their historical existence and discover truths that are somehow beyond history. As historical beings, humans must struggle to find universality in the flux of change. In other words, the true, good, and beautiful exist but they are contingent on historical context. Universality does not exist wholly apart from change and historical life, but it is indissolubly bound up with it.
To conservatives of a neoconservative persuasion, this view may seem to be similar to the one represented by progressivism. Babbitt's view, however, is distinct from the progressives' view because they tend to emphasize the changing part of life that leads one to believe that there is little or nothing to anchor human life other than change itself. They are what Babbitt calls philosophers of the many because they take the flux and change of life as its whole. The progressive doctrine of the living constitution is a classic example of the political application of this view. Contemporary Americans should not be bound by the principles of the eighteenth-century Framers because times have changed. Changing circumstances make the Framers' principles outdated and irrelevant. Judges, then, need to update the Constitution to the times by interpreting it in a way that makes it fit the circumstances of contemporary life. The theory of constitutional interpretation held by former Supreme Court justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall represent this view.
The alternative approach to constitutional interpretation that is most common on the political Right is represented by Justice Antonin Scalia and Robert Bork among others. In their view, the Constitution has fixed meaning. Scalia's brand of originalism does not deny the need for change but insists that constitutional change occur in accordance with the fixed values of the Constitution that are known from the document itself and the historical context in which it was written. To update the Constitution to the times requires a constitutional amendment that is the outcome of following the established democratic process. When judges change the meaning of the Constitution through interpretation, they subvert this process and the democratic values on which it was based. Policy decisions, as opposed to constitutional questions, are to be made not by judges but by legislators within the constitutionally established democratic process.
Even this degree of commitment to unchanging values and the democratic process is insufficient for Jaffa. He has chastised Scalia, Bork, and Ed Meese for subscribing to a variety of originalism that is indistinguishable from the one demonstrated by Justice Roger B. Taney's infamous opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford. They conflate the sovereign will of the people (expressed in the Constitution) and "the reason of the people" that informs their sovereign authority. 13 The reason of the people, according to Jaffa, is the ultimate measure of deciphering the meaning of the Constitution, not the original intent as historically cast in the document. The particular clauses of the Constitution must be read through the prism of the overarching "proposition of natural human equality" in order to discover its meaning. Without knowledge of the principles of the Constitution, it is impossible to differentiate between the compromises of the document (e.g., the necessary evil of slavery that allowed the document to be created) and its authoritative operating principles (e.g., natural equality). Constitutional meaning, in other words, comes not from the document's historical development but from the ahistorical natural principles that express universal truths. The principles are known from the Declaration of Independence and Lincoln's statements on equality and American identity. The combination of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence allows one to interpret the former in light of the natural justice and natural equality articulated in the latter. Jaffa explains that "the Declaration remains the most fundamental dimension of the law of the Constitution." Thus, Jefferson and Lincoln are central figures in the search for constitutional meaning even though the former was not a delegate to the Constitutional Convention and had significant reservations about the document, and the latter was not born when it was written and ratified.
The trans-historical universal values of the Declaration should never be replaced or altered because they are immune from the forces of change; i.e., under no circumstances would it be right to deviate from these values. They are the sine qua non of American constitutionalism and the reason why "the physical force by which the United States may protect and defend itself is a moral force." 14 This notion of universality fails to account for the limits of human rationality and the ambiguity of ethical knowledge. It is one thing to assert the existence of natural law and another to suggest that human understanding of it has reached its zenith. Moreover, to suggest that a particular nation like the United States is morally privileged because it represents the natural law more than its political rivals is to invite empire to replace republican constitutionalism.
What, then, would a type of constitutionalism based on Babbitt's political theory look like? It would begin by acknowledging that the American Framers' achievement was extraordinary and thus worthy of conservation. It would interpret the meaning of the Constitution not as a trans-historical truth but as historically derived and thus understood as a product of a particular historical context that is only applicable to similar historical circumstances and cultural conditions. It would suggest that while the Framers' ideas deserve great respect, ensuing generations of Americans must imitate the Framers by reconstituting political truths in changing circumstances. This requires not the abandonment of the Framers' ideas but a synthesis that incorporates their insights with those of others. If eighteenth-century Americans had held to the view that political truth had been captured once and for all in the British tradition, then their reconstitution of that tradition could not have occurred. Intellectual provincialism and dogmatic reification inhibit the search for new insights that make the reconstitution of old truths in new circumstances possible.
Kirk, who was a student of Babbitt's work, recognized this point and advocates a type of originalism that differs from that of Scalia, Bork, or Meese. Kirk is willing to give judges more discretion than Bork but far less than the progressives. Kirk writes approvingly of John Marshall's "liberal construction of the Constitution," which he believes "did not signify repudiation of the doctrine of original intent." He argues for "a reasonable attachment to the written text of the Constitution," which he distinguished from "a blinkered literalism at all times." 15 Kirk's originalism is not the consequence of imposing a particular methodology on judges as much as it advocates a disposition of character and imagination that can exercise discretion while maintaining constitutional fidelity.
While progressives are willing to assume that contemporary conceptions of justice are superior to those of the past, Kirk, Babbitt, and Burke recognize that while technology and material wealth may progress, wisdom as well as moral character can be gained and lost. The works of Plato and Aristotle, for example, provide enduring insights into the human condition but do not represent the full range or scope of human understanding. Plato did not conceive of the potential for popular government as the American Framers did. Insight is gained when synthesis between Plato, Aristotle, and the American Framers occurs. The same kind of synthesis can take place by using the Framers' ideas and those that came into being in ensuing centuries. To this way of thinking, the claim that one generation, thinker, book, or document could capture the truth for all time ignores the complexity of historical life.
Changing circumstances bring challenges that require new insights. Creative continuity is necessary to meet these challenges. This is to say that true insight never lets go completely of past experience and insight but uses them as guideposts to navigate the search for truth in new circumstances. It is the spirit of the search that must be imitated more than the form of past achievements. A radical break from these past achievements that severs the present from the past is a clear indication that the search has failed to use the wisdom of the ages to reformulate conceptions of the good. A Jacobin impatience with the conventional order combined with the hubris that one has the exclusive solution to existing problems at hand indicates a temperament unsuited to exercise judicial review responsibly. It is not surprising that the New Deal and Great Society Courts frequently broke with long-established precedents. 16 Expecting a society that has lost touch with the underlying moral realism that gave life to the Framers' constitutionalism to abide by originalism is a bit like selling an abstinence program to prostitutes. For fidelity to the Framers' Constitution to be possible on a broad scale, it is first necessary to prepare the way by shaping the imaginations and character of the individuals who are expected to follow the Constitution. Americans have generally accepted the progressive idea of the living constitution. Their conception of constitutional politics is clouded by a dense fog of political romanticism. Unless the fog is cleared, appeals to stagnant ahistorical principles or methods of constitutional interpretation will not inspire a renewal of constitutional conduct. If political conduct is to be more consistent with the Constitution, the intuitive conception of life that prevails in society must comport with what is real and possible.
Yet some may ask if the exercise of discretion and creativity as described by Babbitt can be anything but a different variety of ethical relativism. Restated, the question is a matter of what, specifically, individuals and societies will subordinate themselves to if they follow Babbittian constitutionalism. For Kesler, Babbitt and Kirk are engaged in "traditionalism," which he describes as having a "reverence for the past" that "is unreasonable, unprincipled-and fundamentally no different from liberalism's unprincipled commitment to the future." What irks Kesler about traditional conservatism is what bothered Strauss about Burke. Traditional conservatives do not "acknowledge any objective standards by which we may distinguish just from unjust, good from bad, true from false, and so provides us no guidance in choosing what elements of the past should be conserved as a matter of expedience, and what elements must be conserved as a matter of justice." Because they lack the ability to make such judgments, traditional conservatives fail to realize that "the central idea of our political tradition" is "equality, the equality of natural rights." All conservative principles emanate from the one overarching "'abstract truth' of human equality." 17 The Babbittian answer to the question of standards is that statesmen and citizens are obligated to follow something substantively different than ahistorical or trans-historical truths, which are little more than the favorite platitudes of their authors. Babbitt submits that ethical and constitutional standards must be connected to the historical world in order to be real and to have a bearing on political and existential order. Tradition is a guide but not by itself the measure of justice and the good. To say that tradition is a better guide than reason is not to say that it should be the only guide or that it is self-interpreting. It is a way of imparting humility and recognizing the limits of human rationality. Tradition is indispensable because without it there is no way of knowing what is real and what is possible. All meaningful standards of justice are historically derived. Consequently, in the case of judicial conduct, constitutional history and legal precedents should be used as guides to rendering just decisions in particular cases. Judges must use moral imagination and philosophical reason to exercise the very discretion that Kesler claims traditional conservatives lack. A certain habit of mind and disposition of character are necessary to exercise the practical wisdom that results in justice. To emphasize the point, it bears repeating that prudential statesmanship requires a combination of character, intellect, and imagination that sees reality as it is, is disposed to doing the good, and uses the tools of politics to impart justice. The problem of civilization, as Babbitt understood it, was not so much a problem of rational insight as it was ethical conduct. Babbitt explains that "the final reply to all the doubts that torment the human heart is not some theory of conduct, however perfect, but the man of character."
The insight of the American Framers is that they created a constitutional system that incorporated the reality of the ethical life. To find justice, it is necessary to deliberate, as opposed to allowing, the passion of the moment to prevail. The Framers' opposition to pure democracy recognizes this reality. Madison's differentiation between pure democracy and republican government in Federalist 10 hinges on the fact that in the former there is no deliberation while in the latter representatives refine and enlarge the public views. When Hamilton argued for a "permanent will" that would check the fleeting and arbitrary will of the people, he was expressing this central tenet of Babbitt's constitutionalism. For its success, American constitutionalism depends on the ability of statesmen and citizens to follow the quality of will that makes justice, order, and the good possible. Rigid adherence to stagnant reified principles or the Framers' original intent does not require sufficient attention to the ethical life in the way that Babbitt describes it. It is rather a form of legal or constitutional fundamentalism that takes the rule, principle, or dogma as the good rather than an approximation of what constitutes the good. Having faith or belief in principles may be part of what is required for constitutional government to foster the ends of politics, but faith in principles alone is insufficient. Ethical discretion is unavoidable in the work of constitutional politics and adherence to unchanging principles is no substitute for the quality of character that some have called republican virtue. Does Babbitt's view give license to judges to change the meaning of the Constitution so that it can be adapted to the times? Would a federal judge imbued with Babbitt's political theory vote with activist judges who decide cases to promote progressive policies? It is hard to imagine a Babbittian judge voting with the majority in cases like Wickard v. Filburn, NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steele, Roe v. Wade, or Kelo v. New London. Like Scalia, a Babbittian judge would recognize that the courts were not designed as the instrument for change. They have a conservative purpose, i.e., to preserve the historical constitution by ensuring that other branches and levels of government abide by it. As Hamilton well understood, the courts and the Constitution are intended to be instruments of permanence, not change. For the Constitution to live, to be a truly living document (i.e., to be a living force as opposed to a dead letter), it must be understood as something created in a particular historical context and serve the purpose of checking the will to power that tries to exceed legal boundaries of power. To serve this function, judges must be attuned to the historical Constitution and not some ahistorical version of the document. Much of the damage that progressive justices have done to the Constitution over the years stems from the application of abstract Jacobin principles like equality that belie the historical Constitution. If reason, divorced from historical context, gives meaning to the Constitution, what is to keep a judge from claiming to have discovered a meaning of the Constitution that is historically anachronistic? If the principles are trans-historical, why is the history of the founding period important to the search for constitutional meaning?
It is difficult to conceive of a variety of American conservatism that is not significantly connected to Western Civilization and thus Europe. It is no surprise that Russell Kirk, Leo Strauss, or Eric Voegelin placed the meaning of America in a European context. America was born of Western and European civilization. One may quibble about the particular way American conservatism reacted to the crisis of modernity, but the problems of modernity that gave rise to conservative ideas have not been fundamentally different in America than they have been in Europe. Consequently, the political theories of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Burke have relevance because they are part of the development and history of Western Civilization of which the United States is a part. Moreover, the relevance of philosophical truth and aesthetical beauty, while conditioned to some extent by circumstance, have a universal quality that can enrich the lives of individuals beyond the immediate culture in which they were created. Part of Kirk's argument is that there are variants of Burkean conservatism in American history. His book The Roots of American Order traces connections between American thinkers and their ancestral past. In The Conservative Mind, John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Fisher Ames, and others are included as representatives of the conservative tradition in America. Hamilton's reaction to the French Revolution, something largely ignored by Kirk, is remarkably Burkean. While the political theory that Hamilton forged in response to the Jacobins is not as theoretically rich as Burke's, it nonetheless is inspired, at least in part, by the same moral realism that dates back to ancient and Christian sources.
Kirk commonly pointed to America's conservative inclinations regarding property, and he understood the conservatism of the Constitution, a document based on a realistic view of the human condition. American political institutions recognized the imperfection of human nature and the consequent need to put institutional restraints on human will and appetite. If anything, Kirk underestimates the conservative inclinations of Americans like Hamilton and Washington who were steadfast in their reaction to Jacobinism and realistic about the possibilities of politics. The American Revolution and the formation of the American Constitution are remarkable in that they resisted the temptation to veer off in a radical direction. The unwritten constitution in America helped to keep its leaders on the path of prudence that included the reconstitution of British culture. Later thinkers like John Randolph of Roanoke, John C. Calhoun, and Orestes Brownson provided a defense of the Framers' tradition and philosophical assumptions against Jeffersonian and Jacobin efforts to democratize America. The fact that by the twentieth century this battle had largely been lost does not mean that the whole of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century efforts to uphold the American tradition was lost.
Gottfried notes that contemporary conservatives advocate originalism as the preferred way of interpreting the Constitution. He suggests that it is not as prominent as other more liberal objectives advocated by conservatives like neo-Wilsonian foreign policy or the welfare state. What is originalism other than an attempt to keep the older underlying tradition of the Framers' alive as a living force in contemporary political life? It does, however, make a difference if that tradition is construed as a body of ahistorical principles or as part of the historical development of the United States. To say that the United States was not founded but organically derived does not mean that it was the product of an arbitrary evolutionary process. Civilization, Babbitt reminds us, is something that must be willed. Concrete individuals must face the challenges of historical life and rise above the life of pleasure and self-serving power.
Americans do well to remind themselves of the important role that George Washington played in the formative period of American independence and constitutional development. The weight of his character played an essential role in the American victory over Great Britain and in the ensuing creation of constitutional government. His presence at the Constitutional Convention gave the document it produced an air of legitimacy it needed to convince a skeptical nation that stronger national government was vital to the survival of the nascent republic. His reaction to the Newburgh conspiracy and his conduct as president helped to shape an American conception of republican government that was both similar to and distinct from the ancient republics of Greece and Rome. The ideas that comprise American constitutional government mean very little if they are not brought to life by the conduct of individuals like Washington, whose modest use of power set an example for his predecessors who could use his example as a model worthy of emulation. In other words, the idea of American constitutional government was tentative and incomplete as long as it was nothing more than an idea or set of principles. As Americans conducted themselves throughout the centuries, they gave deeper meaning and purpose to what existed on parchment in 1787. This view suggests a degree of pliability in constitutional principles and conduct. To be true to the Constitution in conduct, it is necessary for a statesman to be like the good man described in Plato's and Cicero's political theory, ready for action because constitutional fidelity is not as simple as following a blueprint of principles. Preparing for constitutional action requires not only knowledge of the Framers' principles but attunement to the larger world view and spirit that inspired them to produce a remarkable conception of republican government.
The Prospects for Conservatism and Its Meaning
It is less troublesome that conservatism's meaning has evolved than the particular way in which it has evolved. If conservatism has been subsumed if not replaced by a variety of liberalism, then Gottfried is correct to wonder if conservatism is worth saving. Yet, as Burke and Babbitt understood, for the permanent things to be a living force in society, they must be repeatedly reconstituted in changing circumstances.
What conservatives have failed to do is provide viable alternatives to mass culture and its tendency to undermine institutions and ideas that conservatives consider essential to civilization. For years, Robert Nisbet wrote about the collapse of community and why both the war state and the welfare state were antithetical to family, neighborhood, church, and other cultural institutions that provided individuals with purpose, identity, and meaning. Wendell Berry, although not a man of the political Right, was admired by Kirk because his novels portray the importance of place and scale to humane living. Gottfried does not account for recent developments in scholarship that are less concerned with political outcomes and distinctions and are more interested in recovering the human scale and the virtues of home. There is an anti-humanitarian sentiment inspired by Berry and others that has given rise to a new variety of conservatism that is at odds with the very neoconservatism Gottfried opposes. A synthesis of seemingly politically disparate ideas is commonly found in the essays published by the journals Humanitas and Front Porch Republic Magazine.
The prospects for conservatism depend on several factors, including the work of scholars who do not shy away from the work of reconstituting the good in ways that transcend the older divisions of Left and Right. In foreign affairs this means abiding by a realistic view of international relations while recognizing how destructive the war state is to conservative ways of life. In economic and fiscal matters, it means acknowledging the general benefits of free markets while opposing concentrations of economic power that are incompatible with the kind of community life lauded by Nisbet and Berry. It means giving due attention to Wilhelm Röpke's notion of the humane economy and E. F. Schumacher's defense of the small as beautiful. In religious life, it means depoliticizing religion as well as replacing sentimental humanitarianism and the natural goodness on which it is based with the recognition of man's fallen nature and the need for inner restraint as the foundation for virtue.
Politics alone will not provide a recovery of civilization. A typical reaction to the listing of problems in American society is the call for political candidates who will promote the cause by running for office and supporting the right kinds of public policy. If nothing else was learned from the Reagan and Bush presidencies, it should be obvious that politics alone is not enough to rectify the state of American culture and that a vibrant conservatism is one that, as Burke knew, could ignite change that was able to renew old insights and make them a living force in the present age. The American Constitution is in danger of becoming a dead letter. A brand of conservatism that offers little more than stagnant moral platitudes or methods for interpreting the Constitution stands little chance of reinvigorating American and Western Civilization. The task facing American conservatives today is the same one faced by the Framers in the eighteenth century: to understand the times and use creative continuity to forge a path, both old and new, that meets the challenges of the day while maintaining fidelity to the permanent things.
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